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ABSTRACT 
The Seamless Maritime Concept is the need to treat 
awareness, security, defense in a comprehensive, cohesive 
manner. Continuing discussion of maritime homeland security 
and defense capability requirements and resources 
allocation fails to recognize the unique requirements of 
the maritime domain.  Enormous thought and resources have 
been put towards enhancing maritime homeland security and 
maritime homeland defense readiness.  Unfortunately, the 
efforts to date treat “defense” and “security” disparately, 
ignoring the necessity to include all maritime domain 
partners.  The Seamless Maritime Concept suggests that 
incremental changes to processes, boundaries, and markets 
have little chance to dramatically improve performance.  
The Seamless Maritime Concept suggests a new way of 
addressing the problem.  
The Coast Guard’s motto is “Semper Paratus” or “Always 
Ready.”  It reflects the quality of the people; the people 
will not let any obstacle prevent them from accomplishing 
the mission.  Admiral Loy’s “dull knife” declares the 
desperate need to re-capitalize the Coast Guard cutter and 
air craft fleets.  And the Coast Guard’s long standing 
record of success all combine to demonstrate that given 
some resource support that the Coast Guard can get it 
(maritime security) done.  Conversely, failure to 
recapitalize will drive the Coast Guard toward obsolescence 
and preclude an opportunity to enhance the security and 
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION  
Defending our Nation against its enemies is the 
first and fundamental commitment of the Federal 
Government. Today, that task has changed 
dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great 
armies and great industrial capabilities to 
endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of 
individuals can bring great chaos and suffering 
to our shores for less than it costs to purchase 
a single tank. Terrorists are organized to 
penetrate open societies and to turn the power of 
modern technologies against us.1 
Enhancing maritime homeland security and defense is a 
difficult task.  The paper will examine what has been done 
and what is currently planned.  The paper will suggest that 
our combined efforts thus far have been fractious and 
uncoordinated.  It will then suggest how a Seamless 
Maritime Concept is required to guide future plans, forces, 
and resource allocation.  An integrated, holistic approach 
is needed to provide security and defense options.   
There are several significant assumptions that move 
the paper forward.  First, the paper assumes that 
asymmetric terrorist attacks against the United States will 
continue.  This is logical, given the tremendous effect of 
the attacks of September 11, 2001 (911), the continued 
existence of shadowy terrorist networks (such as Al Qaeda), 
and the United States’ position as a sole world superpower.  
Second, the paper assumes that vulnerabilities continue to 
exist in the maritime domain.  Our vast maritime frontiers, 
economic dependence on international commerce and national 
commitment to open markets mandates the need to enhance 
security and provide for proactive flexible defense.                       
1 President George W. Bush, National Security Strategy, The White 
House, 17 September, 2002. 
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Finally, past and current plans to provide security and 
defense in the maritime homeland domain must be reviewed.  
We are making incremental changes to a maritime security 
apparatus developed without thought to asymmetric threats 
or guerrilla adversaries.  Thus, a fresh look at counter-
strategies and supporting force structure is appropriate. 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 
Mr. Paul McHale, highlighted the cooperative “agreement 
between the Coast Guard and Navy [as] simply recognition 
that our nation is best defended through the close 
coordination and combined capabilities of both services.”2 
Mr. McHale’s sagacious comments strike to the crux of the 
matter. Coordination, cooperation, and even a measure of 
integration must be evaluated in the harsh context of 
maritime homeland security and defense, roles and missions, 
and real budget constraints.  
 
A. MARITIME ISSUES    
 
1. Is the “Sleeping Giant” Really Awake?      
After the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, 
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto commented, "I fear that all we 
have done is awaken a sleeping giant, and fill it with a 
terrible resolve."3  In 1942 and 1943, the Sleeping Giant 
did, indeed, awaken.  The vast industrial, economic, 
technical, and human capability of the United States was 
focused on defeating the Axis.  The attack on Pearl Harbor 
was a rallying point for the United States. 
                     
2
 Chris Strohm, Govexec.com, Daily Briefing: Military Bolsters 
Maritime Security Role, 26 March, 2004, pg1 
3 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, 1941,  after the attack on Pearl Harbor  
3 
From 1941 to 1945 U.S. GDP nearly doubled; so did 
personal income.  Increased taxation caused 
federal tax receipts to more than double; federal 
expenditures quadrupled.  The federal budget went 
from a 1941 surplus 3.2% of GDP to a 1945 deficit 
of 12.3% of GDP.  After tax corporate profits 
(with CCA and IVA adjustments) fell sharply as a 
percent of GDP; nominal corporate profits were 
the same in 1945 as in 1942.  Reported inflation 
reached double digits during the war years in 
spite of price controls and rationing.4 
This unity of purpose has not been replicated in post-
911 response.  The commitment to and impact of successful 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq should not be overlooked 
or minimized. The United States has taken significant 
action since 911; a realignment of resources commensurate 
to the threat has begun.  But, the technological advantage 
of the United States has not been mobilized in a manner 
similar to our industrial advantage in 1941.  Our 
conventional success in Afghanistan and Iraq must be 
coupled with a response to counter the fugitive asymmetric 
threat that exists in the homeland.  If the United States 
is to secure and protect the homeland, success abroad must 
be supported by action at home.  Status quo will not 
enhance security or provide for flexible defense in the 
homeland. 
 
2. The “Big Picture” 
There are significant challenges.  The maritime 
services must cooperate to develop strategic and 
operational plans, build maritime forces to execute those 
plans, and integrate Navy and Coast Guard operations.  The 
Navy and Coast Guard must also lead the cooperation between 
                     
4
 Awakening a Giant: a wartime model!, 30 October, 2001, Cumberland 
Advisor, Inc on webpage: http://www.cumber.com/comments/103001.htm 
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their departments to ensure full spectrum coverage across 
the maritime homeland defense and security mission 
spectrum.     
Establishing new mechanisms and levels of cooperation 
will be enormous undertakings.  However, establishing 
cooperation is the only way to tackle the maritime security 
problem.  The problem is not cooperation of lack of 
cooperation; cooperation is critical to resolve maritime 
security issues.  The intent of this paper is to focus on 
the United States littorals and ports, and even more 
specifically on the strategic plans and budgets for those 
maritime regions.  
 
3. Lack of Coherent Policy  
There is no agreement, process, or understanding 
between the DOD and DHS concerning mutual support to 
execute maritime homeland defense and security missions.  
There is no vision on how we will work together to provide 
a more secure homeland.  The current model of cooperation 
outlines the smooth flow of Coast Guard forces to support 
the Navy and military operations.  The construct has been 
reviewed, updated and revalidated.  However, the flow of 
Navy forces to support the Coast Guard and maritime 
homeland domain missions conforms to standard agency 
Request For Assistance (RFA) protocols.   
 
4. Navy’s Response:  Greater Flexibility Overseas 
(FORWARD).  Dodging the Homeland Requirements? 
Recently, the Navy has recognized the need to be more 
flexible and responsive to emerging threats, and the 
dynamic global security environment.  For example, the 
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark’s 2004 
5 
testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Committee 
recognized the need for flexible response. 
The war on terrorism and the unpredictability of 
the global security environment make this an 
immediate imperative.  The nation needs a Navy 
that can provide homeland defense and be both 
forward and ready to surge forward to deliver 
overmatching and decisive combat power whenever 
and wherever needed. We are committed to do so.. 
.  In simplest terms, rather than having only two 
or three CSGs forward-deployed and properly 
equipped at any one time - and an ability to 
surge only a maximum of two more – the FRP (Fleet 
Response Plan) enables us to now consistently 
deliver six forward deployed or ready to surge 
Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) almost immediately, 
plus two additional CSGs in the basic training 
phase in 90 days or less. This FRP capability is 
commonly known as six plus two.5 
However, the Navy’s recognition of the need for 
flexible response focuses on forward, or overseas, 
warfighting and presence requirements and much less on the 
possible need to increase Navy operations near the United 
States homeland.  The Navy continues to be fully deployed 
globally, and the Fleet Response Plan is an appropriate 
response to ensure the Navy continues to meet extensive 
deployment requirements.  The persistent global presence 
and reach of the United States Navy clearly contributes to 
the maritime security of the homeland, but Navy’s presence 
near the shores of the United States, in direct support to 
the Coast Guard’s homeland security mission, is not a 
priority.  
 
5. Maritime Homeland Security verse Maritime 
Homeland Defense 
                     
 
5
 Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, Testimony before 
Senate Armed Services Committee on 10 February, 2004. Pg 6. 
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There are numerous definitions floating around.  No 
surprise that the Department of Defense and the Department 
of Homeland Security definitions are not only ambiguous, 
but contrary and counterproductive to mutual support.  
Homeland Security 
The definition in President George W. Bush's 
National Strategy for Homeland Security is "a 
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce 
America's vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that 
do occur." While this enables the President to 
articulate his vision more clearly, the debate is 
far from over. Congress continues to formulate 
its own definitions and concepts, and could 
expand the executive mandate beyond terrorism. 
For example, future missions might include 
missile defense, computer network operations, and 
coordination of governmental efforts to mitigate 
the effects of manmade and natural disasters.6 
Homeland Defense 
"Protection of U.S. territory, domestic 
population, and critical defense infrastructure 
against external threats and aggression." While 
this definition is somewhat imprecise, its intent 
is to underscore that there are certain missions 
only the U.S. military can perform for the 
nation. They include combat air patrols over the 
United States and maritime interdiction 
operations far from our shores-traditional 
military roles. All other domestic military 
requirements normally are labeled as civil 
support.7  
Applying the definitions in the maritime domain has 
been problematic.  For example, the Coast Guard has the 
capability to conduct global maritime intercept operations                      
6
 Commander Lawrence K. Zelvin, US Navy, "Homeland Security 
Challenges DoD," Proceedings, 128 (November 2002), 66-7. 
7
 Commander Lawrence K. Zelvin, US Navy, "Homeland Security 
Challenges DoD," Proceedings, 128 (November 2002), 66-7. 
7 
(MIO).  The Coast Guard believes they also have the 
authority to conduct boardings anyway.  However, the 
Department of Defense feels that the authority transfers to 
the Combatant Commanders within their respective areas of 
responsibility.  There is not a line in the water that 
clarifies the authority issue; the Coast Guard conducts 
global operations.   
 
6. How Much Redundancy Should Their be Between 
Departments 
Capability and resource redundancy is expensive.  
However, contingency and surge compatibility is both 
necessary and appropriate.  Where does appropriate 
compatibility and surge capacity become unnecessary 
redundancy?  Navy and Coast Guard discussions concerning 
the Coast Guard as the national patrol boat manager, 
Deepwater communications and weapons systems 
interoperability, and deployment schedules are outstanding 
examples of complementary capabilities and cooperation.  
While the Navy’s justification for capabilities is solely 
dependent on defense missions, the Coast Guard’s 
justification includes readiness for defense missions and 
traditional Coast Guard missions.  The redundancy 
discussion frequently fails to recognize that the Navy does 
not have a requirement to execute non-military missions.  
Moreover, the Coast Guard through its statue as a law 
enforcement agency and military service must be prepared 
for both.  The same is not true of the Navy.   
This doesn’t mean that the Navy cannot be an 
appropriate supporting service during times of maritime 
homeland security duress; it just means the Navy force 
should not be built for that secondary purpose.  The Navy’s 
8 
warfighting capability set includes numerous assets that 
can augment the Coast Guard during crisis. 
Some amount of redundancy is desirable.  How much 
redundancy is appropriate is a constantly changing, 
depending of the security and defense environments, 
deployments, threats, resource status, etc.  At a minimum 
the redundancy must include a Coast Guard force structure 
and capability mix sized for the non-military mission and 
readiness for defense missions.  The Navy force structure 
planning and capability mix must be sized for military 
missions.  The Navy does not need to be built to non-
military mission specifications; however, that does not 
preclude the use of Navy resources and capabilities in 
dealing with homeland security contingency plans.  A 
Seamless Maritime Concept would include all resources.  
    
7. U.S. Northern Command  
Just as the Department of Defense addressed the Soviet 
bomber threat and created the North American Air Defense 
Command (NORAD), so to the Department of Defense must 
evolve with the 911 threats.  U.S. NORTHCOM is part of that 
evolution.  
Just as NORAD established the relationship between 
Canada and the United States, between the Air Force and Air 
National Guard there are similar opportunities for U.S. 
NORTHCOM to resolve maritime warning and response 
capabilities, National Guard and reserve roles in domestic 
support events, and perhaps streamline civil support 
processes between the states, federal authorities, and 
Army. 
   
9 
8. Service Recapitalization Efforts, 
Interoperability, Cooperation  
The services are engaged in re-capitalization plans 
and ongoing budget planning cycles; the services are 
committed to independent efforts to re-invent themselves.   
Independent transformation potentially challenges 
interoperability and contingency plans.  Similar to the 
discussion in response to redundancy between the services, 
the Navy must recognize the value of the Coast Guard 
partnership and the necessity to ensure the Coast Guard has 
the appropriate communications, weapons, and sensor systems 
to be compatible with the Navy.   
For example, the Navy receives congressional funding 
to support the Coast Guard Cutters weapons and 
communications systems.  The Coast Guard’s Deepwater 
acquisition project started in 1997 and the first two ships 
are due to be delivered in 2006.  The Navy funding does not 
fully cover the new systems and thus they have not 
committed to fund the weapons and communications systems 
aboard the new cutters.  At present, the cutters will be 
delivered without those systems.  The impact of the Navy’s 
decision to not support the Deepwater weapons and 
communications capable substantially hinders the Coast 




There are an infinite number of maritime scenarios.  
The multi-jurisdictional and geographic scenarios below 
illustrate just a few of the potential issues that seam 
driven strategies present.   
10 
#1 – Multi-jurisdictional and tracking:  A small 
coastal freighter departs from the Guajira Peninsula on the 
Northern coast of Colombia.   The freighter is just large 
enough to carry 6 containers, along with an assortment of 
typical coastal freighter goods.  The coastal freighter 
island hops up through the Leeward Islands, dropping off 
and picking up cargo.  Eventually the coastal freighter 
makes its way from the Leeward Islands up through the 
Bahamas, and then across the Florida Straights and into 
Miami.  Small coastal freighters litter the sides of the 
Miami River.  The coastal freighter is not large enough 
(300 gross tons) to be required to provide 96 hour pre-
arrival notification, however the freighter provides 
advance notice.  Once inside the U.S. territorial waters, 
the freighter continues towards the Miami River, passing by 
the Cruise Ship terminals.  As the coastal freighter passes 
by the cruise ships, one of the containers explodes.  The 
explosion is a conventional bomb, not nuclear, not 
chemical, and not biological.  However, at the outset 
Customs, Coast Guard, Florida Marine Police, Miami Marine 
Police, port authority security, cruise ship security, the 
environment protection agency, state and county police, 
fire department, emergency responders and possibly the 
Florida National Guard all respond to the incident.  
Shortly after the incident is publicized, more federal 
authorities start to respond to the incident including the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, 
the Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Northern 
Command. 
As the port of Miami is closed to preclude a potential 
second attack the commercial enterprises start to respond 
11 
to the incident, trying to move shipping in the area to a 
safer location and to ensure the ability to move the 
shipping.   
The enormous uncoordinated response causes chaos in 
the port area, as the cruise terminal continue to burn. 
At present, there is no ability to track the ship 
during its transit from Colombia.  Also, the ship was not 
boarded prior to entry, but because it is less than 300 
gross tons it is allowed to enter port.  The ship explodes 
in a multi-jurisdictional area. The attack specifically 
takes advantage of the seam between agency and service 
responsibility, as well as the inability of the U.S. to 
pre-determine cargo before entry and to track the vessel 
during transit.   
#2 – Geographic seam:  There is intelligence that a 
ship bound for the U.S. is carrying illegal drugs, 2 tons 
of cocaine.  In addition the ship may be carrying 
terrorists.  The ship is detected by the Navy 12 miles off 
the coast of San Diego.  The Navy does not have a Coast 
Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) on board, and 
there are no Coast Guard or Customs vessels in the area.  
The Navy does not have the authority to board the vessel.  
The Navy briefs the situation through the chain of command.  
A short fuse discussion on whether the case is maritime 
homeland security or maritime homeland defense ensues.  The 
risk of potential terrorists is weighed against the 
appearance of law enforcement inside U.S. territorial 
waters.  The decision is made to have the Navy conduct a 
right of approach questions and to conduct a visit, board, 
search and seizure (VBSS) boarding.  The Navy conducts the 
boarding and determines that there is 2 tons of cocaine on 
12 
board, but there are no terrorists.  Has the Navy conducted 
a legitimate defense boarding, or have they conducted an 
illegal law enforcement boarding?   
The scenario is not meant to spotlight posse 
commitatus.  The scenario is meant to spotlight the 
inability of the United States to shift Navy resources to 
the Coast Guard.  If a Coast Guard Cutter had been on 
scene, the cutter could have conducted both missions.  
Similarly, if the Navy ship had a LEDET on board it could 
have conducted a law enforcement boarding.  However, no 
mechanism is in place for Navy ships to shift to the Coast 
Guard to provide homeland security support.  Conversely, 
there are mechanisms in place to shift Coast Guard Cutters 
to the Navy to support homeland defense missions.  As the 
scenario demonstrates, the difference between a law 
enforcement event and a defense event may not be known 
until after interception and interdiction.  
 
C. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study reviews current policy and relationships, 
examining issues and explaining the rationale for change.  
The primary objective of the paper is to further the 
maritime homeland security and defense discussion, focusing 
on a new approach to the issues.  The secondary purpose of 
the paper is to encourage action.  For example, while the 
NFPS clearly articulates the National Fleet concept it has 
not been actualized or operationalized.  A joint or 
combined programming office needs to be created.  
Similarly, the Memorandum of Agreement between the 
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense 
13 
establishing the Command and Control structure for the flow 
of Coast Guard forces in support of military operations has 
been revalidated.  However, the reciprocal Memorandum of 
Agreement establishing the flow of Navy and Department of 
Defense resources to the Department of Homeland Security 
has stalled.   
Third, there must be a discussion of current 
strategies, current acquisition commitments in the context 
of moving the discussion towards alignment and clarifying 
roles and missions.  There needs to be a discussion of the 
road ahead, strategically and supported by a force plan. 
 
D. POLICY OVERVIEW 
 
1. National Fleet Policy Statement 
The grand intent of the National Fleet Policy 
Statement8 (NFPS) has not been actualized.  The policy 
statement and reaffirmation are clear, but the NFPS lacked 
specific mechanisms to establish joint programming offices 
or combined design efforts. Since the end of World War II, 
the Coast Guard has provided the Navy with expeditionary 
port security, maritime intercept expertise, and fleet 
operations tempo relief.  Post-911, these important 
activities no longer, of themselves, demonstrate 
satisfactory integration or cooperation.  Also, integration 
as outlined in non-binding agreements not endorsed by 
Department Secretaries or Congress, such as the National 
Fleet Policy, are dangerously misleading.  Real and binding 
integration must be considered.  
 
                     
8
 National Fleet Policy Statement of 2002, stated in entirety a 
content in footnote 41, page 48  
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2. The 1995 Memorandum of Agreement Concerning the 
USCG Capabilities and Resources to Support the 
National Military Strategy      
The 1995 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the 
Department of Defense and Department of Transportation 
concerning Coast Guard capabilities and resources to 
support the National Military Strategy defines the 
strategic relationship between the Navy and Coast Guard.  
Ironically, this MOA boils down to Coast Guard support to 
the Combatant Commanders; a one-stop-shopping list of Coast 
Guard capabilities available to support defense missions.  
The MOA is outdated because Coast Guard capabilities have 
not been updated, and because the agreement does not 
recognize the role of Navy support to the Coast Guard for 
maritime homeland domain missions. 
While the Department of Defense’s 2001 Quadrennial 
Defense Review unequivocally stated the highest priority of 
the U. S. military is to defend the homeland from attack by 
any enemy, which includes terrorists, there has been little 
evidence to suggest that either the Department of Defense 
or the Navy are acting proactively to adapt to new 
priorities.9   
In fact the General Accounting Office was asked to 
assess the Department of Defense structure of U.S. forces 
for domestic military missions.  The report was 79 pages 
long, but the only mention of the Navy in the context of 
homeland defense was to fill in the blanks of a personnel 
tempo discussion of all the services.10  
                     
9
 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to 
Assess the Structure of U. S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions, 
(GAO-03-670, Washington, D. C.: Jul. 11, 2003). 
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 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, 30 
September 2001. 
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However the Coast Guard’s Maritime Homeland Security 
Strategy addressed security issues related to the National 
Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security (see Figure 1).    
 
 
Figure 1.   Alignment of Strategic Objectives11 
 
The National Security Strategy for the United States 
of America states, “the aim of the strategy is to help make 
the world not just safer but better.  Our goals on the path 
to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, 
peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human 
dignity. To achieve these goals, the United States will... 
transform America’s national security institutions to meet                      
11
 Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. 
Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington D.C., December 2002, pg 17. 
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the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first 
century.”12  The clear implication is that we must adapt to 
the new threats, new environment, and leverage technology 
to aid in the effort.  
National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America states the military will: “assure our allies and 
friends; dissuade future military competition; deter 
threats against the U.S. interests, allies, and friends; 
and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.”13  
The 2004 National Defense Strategy states: 
The Department must take action to secure the 
United States from direct attack and counter, at 
a safe distance, those who seek to harm the 
country. . . work to secure strategic access . . 
. and the global commons of international waters, 
airspace, space, and cyberspace.  More 
specifically, the four defense objectives are to: 
secure the United States from direct attack, 
secure strategic access and retain global freedom 
of action, establish security conditions 
conducive to a favorable international order, and 
strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend 
with common challenges.14 
The role of the National Military Strategy provides 
focus for military activities by defining a set of 
interrelated military objectives from which the Service 
Chiefs and Combatant Commanders identify desired 
capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff assesses risk.15  In addition the National 
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 The National Security Strategy for the United States of America, 
Seal of the President of the United States, September 2002, pages 1 – 2. 
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 The National Security Strategy for the United States of America, 
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 National Military Strategy of the United States of America, A 
Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004, pg 1. 
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 National Military Strategy of the United States of America, A 
Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow, 2004, page iv. 
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Military Strategy defines the environment, guiding 
principles,    military    objectives,    desirable   force  
attributes, and capabilities and functions.  The strategy 
clearly states “today, our first priority is to protect the 
United States.”16  
The flow from the National Security Strategy, to the 
National Military Strategy seems clear. Protecting the 
homeland from attack is the top priority, and that will 
require a fully integrated all domain, all component, 
national effort to accomplish.  It seems logical that all 
domain includes the strategic homeland approaches, however, 
while the strategic document are unanimous in declaring the 
importance of the homeland there is an action gap in actual 
defense presence in the homeland strategic approaches.  
The Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security derived 
strategic objectives from the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security.17  The objectives are to: prevent, 
reduce, protect, and minimize and recover in the maritime 
domain.18  Just as the defense strategic documents flow 
smoothly from one to the next, so too do the security 
strategic documents.  However, just as there has not been 
any change to maritime defense operations the maritime 
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CHAPTER II: STRATEGY AND BUDGET CHALLENGES 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security and the 
Maritime Homeland Security Strategy provide a very sterile 
look at maritime homeland security.  Neither strategy 
discusses the maritime homeland defense, or the complex 
mutual dependencies between maritime homeland security and 
defense.  It is more than problematic to develop a 
comprehensive maritime homeland security strategy in 
isolation and independent of a maritime homeland defense 
strategy, similarly developing a maritime homeland defense 
strategy ignorant of the maritime homeland security 
strategy is not feasible.  The relationship between 
maritime homeland security, maritime homeland defense, and 
even forward presence is complex, intertwined, and perhaps 
most significantly interdependent.  Successful maritime 
homeland security and defense strategies must be 
contiguous.  A strong strategy for security lends itself to 
a strong strategy for defense, and of course a strong 
homeland security and defense strategy enables forward 
presence.   
Homeland Defense? 
The threat of terrorism altered some military 
operations… the current defense strategy, 
published in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
Report, states that the highest priority of the 
U.S. military is to defend the homeland from 
attack by any enemy, which includes terrorists.”19 
Perhaps, the Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, the Navy, 
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 U. S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to 
Assess the Structure of U. S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions, 
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and the Coast Guard all need to work together to reach the 
best possible assignment of roles and responsibilities 
along with symbiotic interaction between strategies.   
The challenge is not merely defining roles and 
developing the strategy.  The extreme difficulty in the 
challenge is bringing disparate entities together to work 
with a single focus and purpose.     
The Navy has reiterated the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review statement that homeland defense is the highest 
priority to mean that response to a terror attack is the 
highest response.  However, the Navy remains fully deployed 
and focused forward.  There Navy continues to participate 
in dialogue with the Coast Guard and homeland security 
partners, however the Navy has not diverted any resources 
or capabilities to the U.S. coastal defense missions. 
 
A. MARITIME DEFENSE ZONE (MDZ) 
 
In 1980, Congress mandated a review of Coast Guard 
roles and mission to identify areas the Coast Guard could 
enhance defense capabilities within statutory limitations.  
At the March 19, 1981 the Navy Coast Guard (NAVGARD) Board 
reviewed a study on Coast Guard wartime tasking.  The 
recommendation of the study concerned the formal linkage of 
the existing Coast Guard management and control 
organization for U.S. coastal area to the Fleet Commander-
in-Chief on each coast.  Specifically, Coast Guard Area 
Commanders could be assigned as U.S. MDZ Commanders, 
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responsible to the Navy Fleet Commanders-in-Chief for 
planning and coordination of the U.S. coastal defense.20 
MDZs were not the first attempt by Navy or Defense 
Department to address coastal defense.  Coastal defense has 
a long history, going back to the very birth of the United 
States.  The attention paid to coastal defense has been 
cyclical.  During World War I, coastal defense was a 
significant priority.  In the aftermath of World War I the 
Navy shifted focus to forward deployments, forward 
presence, and bristled at the need for coastal defense.  At 
advent of World War II demonstrated the failure of homeland 
defense and again a premium was put on coastal defense 
forces. After World War II and at the beginning of the Cold 
War, the Army dissolved their Coastal Artillery Corps and 
the Navy turned the Coast Guard back to the Treasury 
Department, rolled up its harbor nets, decommissioned its 
net layers, and used its Naval District and Sea Frontier 
commands for logistics and administration, not for homeland 
defense.  In response to the Korean War there was a flurry 
of concern about mine warfare, harbor defense, and coastal 
defense.  However, the Navy resolved that to focus on 
convoys, or naval control of shipping.  During the Cold War 
the Navy deployed a variety of systems to provide for a 
coastal defense, include: underwater sound systems, 
maritime patrol aircraft and blimps, and antisubmarine 
carrier task forces.  In the 1970s the Navy’s interest in 
coastal defense was drawn forward.  The Navy’s U.S. coastal 
defense efforts had diminished, albeit the Navy and Coast  
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Guard had rekindled their relationship.  The relationship 
was focused forward, to support Market Time and Stable 
Door.21 
The MDZ command and control structure established 
areas of responsibility and acknowledged the primacy of the 
Coast Guard in coastal defense.  The plan has never been 
exercised.  As evidenced by the Navy’s cyclical attention 
to U.S. coastal defense, the Navy has been reluctant during 
peacetime to provide the necessary assets to train and 
exercise for homeland defense.    Just as the Defense 
Department and the Navy spun into action during each 
conflict in our history, the Global War on Terrorism and 
Iraqi Freedom demand close examination of our homeland 
coastal defense readiness.  In conclusion, the Navy’s 
efforts forward are exemplary and the MDZ construct to 
designate the Coast Guard as the lead for U.S. Coastal 
Defense appears as an ideal use of resources to maximize 
the benefit of the U.S. National Fleet capabilities.  
However, if the construct is to be changed it is still part 
of the U.S. Code (14 U.S. Code 89, revision note 10 Nov, 
1986) and can not be discarded without explanation and 
approval of Congress.  
Moreover, the motivations that lead the Department of 
Defense and the Congress to create maritime defense zones 
supporting command structure needs to be evaluated against 
the current requirements.  The Navy’s focus on projecting 
power and concentration of effort, strategy, and resources 
forward is an appropriate response to the National Security 
Strategy and National Military Strategy.  The Department of 
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Defense and Navy’s reluctance to provide U.S. coastal 
defense support, could be attributed to extensive 
commitments globally as well as the Navy’s predilection 
toward forward presence verse homeland defense.  It appears 
the situation calls for a re-affirmation of the MDZ 
construct and Coast Guard leadership, and coordination 
between the services and Departments to appropriately 
source U.S. coastal defense. 
 
B. LAYERED DEFENSE 
 
The concept of defense in depth is perhaps pre-
Clausewitz.  Our current strategic documents all neatly 
conform to the desire to provide defense in depth.  MDZs 
are just one aspect of the layered defense.  However, just 
as defense must be layered between the homeland, littorals, 
high seas, sea lines of communication, and foreign waters 
the defense within each must also be layered.   
A network of layered defense is needed in the maritime 
domain risks oversimplifying the problem.  There are 
several significant and competing issues.  The maritime 
homeland defense and security missions will likely occur in 
the same time and space continuums and require flexibility 
in execution to ensure timely response.  Meeting the 
mission across the port, littorals, approaches, and forward 
presence areas of operations requires clearly defined 
requirements and responsibilities.  The issue of 
establishing protocols for smooth transition of command 
across the responsibility or mission seams has not been 
resolved.   
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C. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION (COAST GUARD) 
 
The assessment of the current situation will address 
the connectivity between strategy and resource employment, 
the effectiveness of resources, and coordination of the 
employment of the national fleet.  
 
1. Connectivity Between Resources and Strategy 
In a post-911 assessment of challenges facing the 
Coast Guard the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
reported: 
The Coast Guard faces fundamental and daunting 
challenges during its transition to the new 
department. Delays in the planned modernization 
of cutters and other equipment, responsibility 
for new security-related tasks as directed under 
the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), 
and mandatory responses to unexpected events, 
such as terrorist attacks or extended terror 
alerts, will have an impact on the Coast Guard’s 
ability to meet its new security-related 
responsibilities while rebuilding its capacity in 
other missions. Also, as one of the agencies 
being merged into the new department, the Coast 
Guard must deal with a myriad of organizational, 
human capital, acquisition, and technology 
issues. The enormity of these challenges requires 
the development of a comprehensive blueprint or 
strategy that addresses how the Coast Guard 
should balance and monitor resource use among its 
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The report fairly points out the enormity and 
significance of the task, and the need for the Coast Guard 
to develop an overarching strategy to address all the 
issues.  
 
2. Effectiveness of Resources 
In several reports, the GOA recommended the Coast 
Guard develop more accurate accounting of resources 
expended as related to performance achieved.23  The Coast 
Guard has generally agreed with each of the GAO reports; 
however changing the current effectiveness metrics in place 
has been difficult.  Further, the Coast Guard has been in 
the awkward position of seeing their aging fleet of cutters 
and aircraft diminish in effectiveness while the 
longstanding metrics of effectiveness have not 
significantly changed.24   The Coast Guard’s efforts to 
expedite the Deepwater Projects delivery of new cutters and 
aircraft has been favorably received by Congress and the 
fiscal year 2005 appropriation fully funds Deepwater 
Project.  Further consideration of expediting and 
increasing the size of the Deepwater acquisition is 
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3. National Fleet 
The Coast Guard and Navy are perhaps more fully 
deployed than they have been in decades.  The services 
continue dialogue on the advantages of a National Fleet 
from both operational and acquisition perspectives.  Moving 
to future projects and operations there is reason for 
optimism.  The current full employment of Coast Guard and 
Navy resources leaves little flexibility for the services 
to implement economies today.  This is not to suggest the 
services are spending a dollar today to save five cents 
tomorrow, or that the services are not meeting all 
obligations.  More over, it appears the services have very 
little surge capacity left to experiment with new combined 
operational employment concepts.  Also, the Coast Guard is 
under increasing pressure to expedite the Deepwater 
acquisition of new cutters and aircraft.  While the Coast 
Guard and Navy have shared information during the 
acquisition process, the informality of the sharing and the 
demands on each service and Congressional mandates have 
precluded joint programming efforts. 
  
D. UNIQUENESS OF THE MARITIME DOMAIN  
 
Providing for security and defense readiness within 
the maritime domain presents a unique set of 
characteristics.  Some of these are characteristics are: 
Characteristics 
Time – Space Continuum: Since the air domain has 
already established the utility of the NORAD model for 
threat monitoring, detection and warning there is a 
tendency to attempt to apply the same concepts to the 
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maritime domain.  The monitoring, detection and warning are 
worthwhile concepts to emulate.  However, the air domain is 
significantly aided by strictly controlled air space and 
extremely limited threat loiter time.  For example, if the 
threat is in the air it has to check in somewhere and it 
has a very limited amount of time it can stay in the air.  
This enables the air domain, NORAD, to assess and address 
the situation within minutes.  In the maritime domain, 
there is no check in or monitoring process. Also the threat 
loiter time can be measured in months verse air domains 
hours or minutes.   
Technology:  Again, comparative to the air domain 
there has been an enormous amount of technological 
development to enhance security and defense responsiveness 
in the air domain compared to the maritime domain.  For 
example, the maritime domain is just now implementing an 
automated identification system (AIS).  The system will 
enable tracking of ships in the maritime domain.  While the 
Maritime Transportation Safety Act (MTSA) of 2002 mandated 
the implementation of AIS, it did not mandate carriage on 
all vessels.  The implementation of AIS is still in the 
inaugural stages.  The Coast Guard is still expanding 
infrastructure to be able to manage the enormous increase 
in information flow as well as developing plans to expand 
the requirement for carriage to all vessels.25 
Focus:  The 911 attacks took advantage of 
vulnerabilities in the air domain.  While vulnerabilities 
exist in the maritime, land, cyber, and numerous other 
domains the emphasis has been on securing the air domain.  
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This is not to suggest that efforts have not been made in 
all domains, or that progress has not been made in all 
domains, just to acknowledge the emphasis has been placed 
on the air domain.  
Awareness:  The impact of an attack taking advantage 
of the maritime domain vulnerabilities could be 
catastrophic.  The damage to the U.S. economy from an 
attack in the ports or maritime domain could have a similar 
economic impact as the 911 attacks.  Some believe a 
successful maritime attack could be much more devastating.26  
Seams:  There are several significant seams.  One of 
the seams is the confusion over roles and missions in 
maritime homeland security and defense between the Navy and 
Coast Guard.  Another is the confusion over when law 
enforcement becomes military operations and when military 
operations become law enforcement.  Another is the 
difficult maritime geography, who is responsible for where?  
Also important is the information sharing seam between; 
military, Federal enforcement agencies, State and local 
agencies, commercial enterprise. 
 Unity of Command and Purpose:  There are numerous 
military, Federal, State and Local, and commercial entities 
that bring capabilities, resources, and information to the 
maritime security and defense table.  However, there is no 
single entity with over arching responsibility.  Also, the 
purposes for cooperation vary significantly; clearly the 
cooperation from commercial enterprise is significant and 
critical to success.  However, the motivation of commercial 
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enterprise is not likely the same as Federal enforcement 
agencies or military services.  
There are other seams, however these seams help to 
paint the picture that the maritime domain is unique and 
must be treated differently than the other domains.  Just 
as effective measure in the maritime domain may not be 
appropriate to the air or cyber domains.    
  
E. STRATEGIC BUDGET ISSUES 
 
Our previous Commandant, the current Deputy Secretary 
of the Department of Homeland Security Admiral Loy, related 
in his State of the Coast Guard address in 1999 that there 
were two ways the a knife could loose its edge; either from 
lack of use, or from over use.  Standing too many quiet 
watches when threats do not materialize could lead to 
complacency.  Conversely, if you overworked a sharp knife 
it could become dull – more dull than it could ever become 
from disuse.  He summarized the analogy by stating that a 
dull knife is a dangerous tool – dangerous to both the 
Coast Guard people and the American people who depend on us 
(Coast Guard).27  The Coast Guard has been addressing 
resource and capability shortfalls since before 911 and 
continues today. 
The Coast Guard’s motto is “Semper Paratus” or “Always 
Ready.”  It reflects the quality of the people, the people 
will not let any obstacle prevent them from accomplishing 
the mission.  Admiral Loy’s “dull knife” declares the 
desperate need to re-capitalize the Coast Guard cutter and 
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air craft fleets.  And the Coast Guard’s long standing 
record of success all combine to demonstrate that given 
some resource support that the Coast Guard can get it 
(maritime security) done.  Conversely, failure to 
recapitalize will drive the Coast Guard toward obsolescence 
and preclude an opportunity to enhance the security and 
defense readiness of the maritime domain.  
The Coast Guard has been designated to take a lead 
role in maritime security.  However, the lead role for 
maritime security makes the recapitalization of Coast Guard 
capabilities even more urgent, than pre-911 desperation.   
   
F. SUMMARY 
 
The challenges to developing a comprehensive maritime 
homeland security strategy, supporting budget, and command 
structure are significant.  The vulnerabilities within the 
maritime domain are significant and the threat will 
continue to evolve in proportion to our sophistication in 
dealing with maritime security.  However, the resources 
available to improve security are also significant.  It 
would be a mistake to wait for the next maritime 911.   
The way ahead must be viewed from the context of the 
entire maritime domain, entire resource requirements (and 
current resources), as well as various roles each service 
and agency must perform.  
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CHAPTER III: THE WAY AHEAD – STRATEGY 
A. BLUE OCEAN STRATEGY28 
 
The business model ‘blue ocean strategy’ is applicable 
to the maritime security and defense missions as it is to 
business.  Simply, the blue ocean strategy suggests the 
best way to generate rapid profit growth is not through 
incremental process changes or to introduce marginally 
variant products.29  The strategy is to identify completely 
new and unmet customer needs, ‘blue oceans’, and look to 
streamline production processes to reduce costs while 
increasing profits.  An excellent example demonstrating 
both the power and profitability of this strategy is the 
Cirque du Soleil.  The Cirque du Soleil is a result of the 
effort to reduce the production costs and over head 
associated with running a circus, improve the entertainment 
value, and create a new market.  Cirque du Soleil’s 
combination of ballet, circus acrobatics, and elimination 
of costly animal maintenance overhead has enabled them to 
increase ticket price while decreasing overhead costs.  
Cirque du Soleil’s success is directly attributable to the 
value in looking at age old entertainment, the circus and 
ballet, and recognizing the value of the strengths of each 
and leveraging those strengths into a new market.  The 
Cirque du Soleil is a dramatic example of the blue ocean 
strategy.  Similar but less dramatic would be to introduce 
existing products to new markets, for example importing 
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Coca-Cola to China.  China provides exposure to an untapped 
large marketplace, and consequently offers the opportunity 
to increase production, gain economies of mass, while 
increasing profits at the margins and through mass.  
However, the business model named ‘blue ocean 
strategy’ is confusing in the discussion of maritime 
homeland security and defense.  Thus for clarity, 
application of the ‘blue ocean strategy’ business concepts 
will be referred to as Seamless Maritime Concept. 
 
B. HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE 
 
The maritime homeland security and defense operations 
fail to recognize the marketplace, area of responsibility, 
has changed significantly.  There has been an enormous 
amount of thought put into enhanced maritime homeland 
security and maritime homeland defense readiness.  
Unfortunately most efforts have treated each separately and 
ignored the necessity to include all maritime domain 
partners, not just the Department of Defense and Department 
of Homeland Security and not just the Navy and Coast Guard.  
The Seamless Maritime Concept suggests that incremental 
changes to processes, boundaries, and markets have little 
chance to dramatically improve performance.  Maritime 
homeland security and defense performance reasonably means 
economic efficiency and operational performance.  For 
example, the Coast Guard’s has traditionally provided 
domestic port security by increasing the number of law 
enforcement patrols performed in a particular harbor, port, 
or bay.  Typically, several Coast Guard 41 foot boats would 
maintain presence in the area ‘secured.’  Current Coast 
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Guard maritime security patrols include these same 
minimally equipped boats patrolling the harbor.  The 
operations fail to recognize the marketplace, area of 
responsibility, has changed significantly.  A poorly armed, 
slow, small boat is not likely to be successful against a 
terrorist attack.  Similarly, a forty year old Coast Guard 
Cutter maintaining surveillance and warning offshore, is 
neither likely to detect or respond to a terrorist threat. 
Both the Coast Guard and Navy are guilty of fully 
employed fleets and resources with little remaining surge 
capability to meet the new responsibilities.  The threat 
has changed, and so to must our strategy, plans, and 
resources. 
   
C. LITTORALS 
 
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, 
stated that he believed the maritime domain needed a 
‘maritime NORAD’ of sorts.30  Admiral Clark’s suggestion is 
the first stab at applying the Seamless Maritime Concept.  
Suggesting that the maritime domain needs a surveillance, 
detection, warning, and response system similar to NORAD is 
extraordinarily insightful.   
 
1. Homeland Security and Defense are Contiguous 
However, the suggestion does not address the gap 
between  maritime  homeland  security and maritime homeland  
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defense.  Unfortunately, the reaction to the comments has 
been to overly focus on either NORAD, or clarification of 
roles and missions.   
In terms of the Seamless Maritime Concept, the 
emergence and intensity of the asymmetric maritime threat 
and the potentially catastrophic impact to the global 
economy provides a real opportunity to initiate new plans 
and processes.  For example, while the Circ de Soleil, 
circus and ballet, example are trite in comparison to the 
consequences associated with maritime homeland security and 
defense the opportunity to take the best from each is very 
real.  Cataloging some of the strengths associated with 
defense31 and security:  
 
 
Figure 2.   Maritime Security Strengths 
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Figure 3.   Maritime Defense Strengths 
 
The asymmetric maritime threat in the strategic 
approaches to both our homeland and economic foundation 
present an emerging operational challenge – significant 
vulnerability combined with increased threat. Historical 
maritime defense and security capabilities are neither 
appropriate nor capable of reducing vulnerability.  In a 
sense, this provides the Seamless Maritime Concept as the 
revolutionary and innovative plans, tactics, and resource 
and technology development and application in the maritime 
domain.  
The benefit in utilizing the Seamless Maritime Concept 
analogy is that it breaks from the more conventional effort 
to make incremental changes to plans and resources.  Or 
more conspicuously, it breaks from the effort to apply long 
standing practices and resources to a fundamentally new 
situation and set of circumstances.   
For example, the use of Coast Guard Cutters designed 
and built in the 1960s primarily for search and rescue 
missions is inadequate to the task of dominance in the 
Defense 









maritime strategic approaches.32  Likewise, Naval Combatants 
designed and built in the 1980s to provide ‘forward 
presence’ and ‘sea strike’ are similarly inappropriate to 
the task of dominance in the U.S. coastal approaches.  
The table below provides a combined listing of the 
security and defense strengths. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Integrated Maritime Security and Defense 
Strengths 
 
The current set of strategies adequately describes 
what is needed in the maritime homeland security and 
defense mission sets.  The strategies are more than 
mutually supporting, that are the same strategy applied to 
the same situation written by different Departments.  More 
over, to be successful the implementation and execution of 
the strategies must be viewed with a single purpose.  
Maritime homeland security and defense strategies and 
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missions are mutually dependent and supportive to the point 
of being indistinguishable.  Thus, a strategy for maritime 
homeland security and defense does not need to define 
boundaries between security and defense, but it must 
embrace that there are no boundaries.  
The threat in the maritime homeland domain and 
commensurate threat to the United States economy dictate 
the best possible solution.  Succumbing to the political 
maneuverings in order to achieve a measure of effectiveness 
has significantly increased risk.  For example, since 1797 
the Coast Guard has been ready to defend the seacoast and 
repel any hostility towards vessels or commerce.33  Port 
security has always been part of the military mission set.34 
Port and waterways security is listed as a subset of the 
Coast Guard’s National Defense mission set on the Coast 
Guard webpage.35 However, the Coast Guard only receives 
budget authorizations for law enforcement related port 
security and a budget supplemental when port security 
missions are defense related and expeditionary.  Simply 
put, the Navy and Department of Defense treat the missions 
as Coast Guard missions, not military missions, and do not 
provide support.  The unfortunate reality is that the 
world, and maritime domain specifically, are much more 
complex and port security and defense missions exist in 
both the domestic and expeditionary arenas.     
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2. Maritime NORAD 
The ‘maritime NORAD’36 model suggestion is another over 
simplification of the maritime domain by comparison to the 
air domain.  Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval 
Operations suggested the model only as a vision picture to 
illustrate how to describe maritime information and 
response requirements.  There needs to be a maritime 
application of surveillance, detection, warning, and rapid 
response.  Similar to the NORAD set of networked sensors 
providing early warning, so too the maritime domain must 
develop an integrated set of sensors to cover the maritime 
domain.  In addition, the NORAD rapid response piece could 
be emulated in the maritime domain.  However, the 
similarity is only at the very lofty strategic level.  
Application of the NORAD strategy template in the maritime 
domain would appear significantly different in application.   
For example, the maritime domain sensor piece will 
require the integration of: 
• sophisticated over-the-horizon detection and 
monitoring capabilities  
• along with database integration, 
• automatic satellite identification-location 
polling,  
• aircraft and surface vessel tracking and 
identification,  
• flexible response across the use of force 
continuum (presence to law enforcement through 
defense),  
• as well as all domain response (boarding teams, 
Special Weapons and Tactics teams, Cutters, 
Combatants, Aircraft (fixed and rotary)).                      
36
 Admiral Vern Clark remarks, "Meeting the Homeland Defense 
Challenge: Maritime and Other Critical Dimensions", Sponsored by the 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, Cambridge, MA., March 26, 2002. 
39 
The Coast Guard’s Maritime Domain Awareness concept 
supposes the need for complete knowledge, across the 
security and defense spectrum, globally, and all the time.37  
More realistically, the NORAD model provides an 
illustrative example of focusing effort toward threat and 
vulnerability.  Likewise, our surveillance-detection-
identification-decision superiority-response capability 
must be comprehensive and sophisticated guarding the 
strategic approach and littorals applicable to the port of 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, California.  However, the 
sophistication necessary to protect the port of Eureka 
(Humboldt Bay), California is significantly less.  The 
vulnerability, threat, and catastrophic consequences are 
significantly different and the operational plan must 
acknowledge the difference to maximize both efficiency and 
economy.  
To achieve the strategic tenants of prevention, 
vulnerability reduction, and minimization of damage and 
recovery we must employ the full set of maritime security 
and defense functional capabilities.   
The maritime security and defense dialogue has been 
distorted by the lack of understanding of the maritime 
domain in the context of the catastrophic impact to the 
global economy if there were a successful attack.  However, 
the most basic principle of warfare has been to defend what 
is important (Clausewitzian corollary is to attack only 
what is significant)38.  Similarly, the most basic principle 
in security is to secure what is valuable and important.  
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For example, banks set up their security systems to protect 
the vault, not the parking lot.  
In the maritime domain, it is absolutely necessary to 
recognize the difference between guarding Los Angeles-Long 
Beach, California as compared to Eureka, California.  
Failure to recognize the difference ensures they’re all the 
same, which essentially means that each of the 261 ports in 
the country, the 95,000 miles of coastline, and even the 
hundreds of thousands of square miles of sovereign 
territorial seas, littorals and strategic approaches are 
all treated the same.   
Risk management, efficient resource utilization, and 
threat-vulnerability prioritization have been fundamental 
to every national strategy ever developed.   
The proper balance between the stated strategies and 
an appropriate implementation plan is to ground the plan 
within the reality of risk management, verse the context of 
risk elimination.  
The Department of Homeland Security and the Coast 
Guard have already identified the 55 tier one ports.  It 
seems reasonable to state that the maritime security and 
defense plan should address each of these ports.  
Strategic, economic, political, and symbolic ports present 
unique vulnerabilities Los Angeles-Long Beach, Chesapeake 
Bay (the coastal access to the capital region), and New 
York City demand attention because of their strategic, 
political, economic, and even symbolic importance to the 
country.  Likewise, there are numerous small ports around 
the country that are locally significant, but strategically 
neutral.  
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3. The Risk Concept 
A comprehensive plan that integrates the national 
strategy objectives, functional capabilities strengths, and 
risk management provides the opportunity to maintain 
security where ever necessary as well as the opportunity to 
surge forces into specified threat areas or random pulse 
operations.  The plan allows for significant attention to 
be paid to Los Angeles-Long Beach, New York City, the 
Chesapeake Bay, and several other critical ports.  In 
addition, a roving capability could be imported to another 
and set of ports like Tampa, Florida or Jacksonville, 
Florida should there be a specified threat, pulse 
operation, or even in support of a National Security 
Special Event like the Superbowl. Finally, the capability 
to provide an expeditionary rapid reaction force would be 
necessary to respond to imminent threats.  
Just as the plan must integrate the various national 
strategy objectives, functional strengths, and risk it must 
also integrate the entire maritime domain.  More over, 
providing surveillance, detection, response off shore must 
be integrated to the surveillance, control, and response in 




The implementation of the national strategy in the 
ports can be built upon three functional capabilities: 
controlled movement, rapid investigation and response, and 
full integration of shore side (global) efforts.   
The implementation of the national strategy must 
address the ports as thoroughly as the littorals.  However 
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complicated the integration of security and defense 
functional responsibilities and capabilities may seem in 
the littorals, they pale in comparison to the ports.  The 
ports must integrate all those entities, capabilities, and 
strategies from the littorals and add in the private 
sector, local and state governments.   
For example, the resources provided to the 2004 G8 
Summit at Sea Island, Georgia included:  
• Over 1,200 people 
• Over 200 boats 
• 5 Coast Guard Cutters 
• 1 Navy Coastal Patrol Boat 
• 11 Helicopters 
• 1 fixed wing aircraft 
• 2 mobile command posts39 
The resources were provided by numerous federal, 
state, and local maritime entities.  The water security 
planning efforts lasted 10 months.  While the security 
failure consequences were exceptionally high, the time 
frame was limited and specific.  And, the maritime accesses 
were remote and controllable.  More succinctly, it was easy 
to protect Sea Island Georgia.  It will not be as easy to 
control major ports like Chesapeake Bay, New York Harbor, 
Boston Harbor, San Francisco, or Puget Sound.   
 
1. Port ‘Control’ 
In the context of enhancing positive control of the 
ports, the NORAD-like surveillance, detection and response 
offshore provides a warning of danger.  Ideally the threat 
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is eliminated.  However, in the cases when the threats make 
it past the littorals and into the port, or they originate 
in the port there must be the ability to control the port 
quickly.   
The most applicable example at present is the airport.  
All traffic on the tarmac is centrally controlled, 
monitored, and security is maintained.  Similarly, security 
internal to the airport is a system of gates, sensors, 
inspections, that reduces risk.  Combined they systems work 
well to enhance air security.  One of the critical flaws in 
the air security system for this analogy is that when an 
individual triggers sensors, unattended bags are 
discovered, or positive suspect screenings occur the result 
is the terminal being shut down.  Traffic flow in the 
terminal stops, and potential aircraft traffic on the 
tarmac is detoured or delayed.  In modeling the airport to 
the maritime port it is not practical to think that the 
port could be closed, and even if we could the negative 
economic impact makes the decision prohibitive.  The cost 
of maritime port closure is exorbitant.  During the Los 
Angeles/Long Beach longshoremen’s strike in 2002 it was 
estimated that the industry lost between $1 billion and $2 
billion a day.40  Ports are geographically several orders of 
magnitude larger than airports.  More importantly, 
security, commercial, and private vessels operate in the 
port autonomously.  There is no equivalent to the Air 
Traffic Control Tower in the ports.   
However, each port does have a port control authority.  
Typically these port control authorities are poorly 
equipped to actually control traffic.  Most operate only to 
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deal with the largest ships.  Traffic moves about the 
larger ships freely and anonymously.  However, Naval Bases 
are quite a different story.  Movement in the harbor 
associated with a military base is controlled by the harbor 
control.  For example, the Naval Station Mayport Port 
Control authority grants all ship movements, monitors the 
movements, and investigates unauthorized movements.  While 
the Naval Base at Mayport is small and easily controlled, 
the model can be extrapolated to larger and more complex 
ports.  A 24-hour lookout with a set of binoculars provides 
surveillance of the Mayport Harbor.  In Chesapeake Bay 
their needs to be a command center with numerous remote 
sensor systems to provide an accurate picture of movement.  
In addition, their needs to be fleet of vessels ready to 
respond to unauthorized vessel movements that need to be 
investigated.  The Coast Guard initiated a project to 
create port command and control nodes in critical ports, 
however the centers do not have resources assigned.  To 
clarify, the intent is not to impose restrictions on access 
and movement.  The intent is to shift from the random 
anonymous open access to a controlled environment.  The 
implementation of the 96-hour notification for vessels 
coming into the United States is an excellent example.  
Requiring advanced notice of port movements provides the 
necessary inputs to enhance the control of the port.  The 
advanced notice has to be nominal enough to provide the 
opportunity for the command and control structure in the 
port to evaluate the vessel, crew, and cargo in the context 
of other movements in the port.  Also, it provides the port 
the opportunity to provide enhanced support to vulnerable 
assets, and also provide for full spectrum response when 
threats are exposed or further investigation is necessary.  
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However, to assure that maritime freedoms are not infringed 
the requirement in the port must be more limited than the 
96 hours and the burden of tracking but access granted 
through a control entity.    
   
2. Investigation and Response 
There are port and harbor control facilities in 
various sized ports around the coastline, which greatly 
varying levels of control.  However, the number of entities 
with jurisdictional, commercial, or private security 
interests in the ports is almost unlimited.  Frequently 
these entities operate autonomously, with little 
coordination to pool capabilities and resources.   
Controlling the ports requires more than knowledge of 
vessels, crews, and cargos in the port but also includes 
investigating vessels, crews, and cargos.   An appropriate 
level of investigation and response requires a level of 
actual presence roaming the ports along with a surge 
capacity to dispatch capabilities to investigate or respond 
to threats.  A fleet of small boats can provide low level 
investigation and presence.  However, the small boats and 
commensurate small crews are poorly equipped to deal with 
the full spectrum of security and defense missions.  The 
Coast Guard’s Maritime Safety and Security Teams provide an 
innovative effort to address the response piece.  However 
the teams effectiveness could be improved by more lethal 
weapons systems and surface and air support.  Just as every 
Cutter or Naval Combatant operating in the littorals needs 
a capable helicopter to enhance the response timeline and 
coverage, so too does the port.  Rapid investigation and 
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response dictates that surge capabilities with an on-call 
delivery system be available.   
Consistent with the overarching principle of risk 
management, the most significant ports’ need significant 
capability all the time.  However, there will be many more 
ports that require substantially less than a full time 
capability.  The spectrum of standby capabilities can be 
adjusted from immediate, to hours, to longer.  
 
3. Full Integration of Shore Side Efforts 
The plan to enhance security is balanced upon port 
control, investigation and response, and full integration 
of the shore side efforts.  The shore side efforts include 
the port security initiative (PSI), the container security 
initiative, Operation Sea Marshall, the efforts of the 
international community, and the efforts of the local 
police.  Just as port control requires a command and 
control system in the port, so to does the integration of 
shore side efforts.  Part of the solution to implementing 
the national strategy is to recognize that the ports 
require a robust command and control structure to be able 
to accomplish port control, investigation and response, and 




CHAPTER IV: THE WAY AHEAD – BUDGET 
The process of interpolating the national strategy in 
the littorals and ports has been clarified.  However, the 
national strategies and operational concepts in the port 
are useless unless the strategies and concepts are 
supported in the budget.  The strategy and concepts are 
dependent upon appropriate resources and an appropriate 
amount of resources. 
Both the Coast Guard and Navy are guilty of fixation 
on the application of currents resources and capabilities 
to meet the new responsibilities.  The threat has changed, 
and so to must our strategy, plans, and resources to meet 
that threat.  
The Navy leadership sees the warfighting environment 
in terms of four navies; the History of the Navy, today’s 
Navy, Tomorrow’s Navy, and the Navy after next.41  The four 
navies translate in budget terms to; focus on maintaining 
the legacy fleet, modernizing the current fleet, building 
the fleet for tomorrow, and designing the future fleets.  
Similarly the Coast Guard is engaged in the Deepwater 
Acquisition project, intended to replace or modernize the 
aged fleet of cutters and aircraft.  Both services face 
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A. NATIONAL FLEET POLICY STATEMENT 
 
The Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Chief of 
Naval Operations, both responsible for building the future 
Naval force of the United States, recognized the potential 
duplicity.  The National Fleet Policy Statement signed in 
July 2002 states:  
The Navy and Coast Guard, under the leadership of 
the Navy-Coast Guard Board (NAVGARD Board), will 
work together to plan and build a National Fleet 
of multi-mission assets, personnel resources and 
shore Command and Control nodes to optimize our 
effectiveness across all naval and maritime 
missions.  The Navy and Coast Guard will 
coordinate, to the extent permitted under 
existing statutory authority, research and 
development, acquisitions, information systems 
integration, resourcing, force planning, as well 
as integrated concepts of operations, 
intelligence, logistics, training, exercises, and 
deployments.  The Coast Guard and Navy will work 
together to plan, acquire and maintain forces 
that mutually support and complement each 
Service’s role and missions.42 
While the policy statement seems clear, the phrase 
“will coordinate, to the extent permitted under existing 
statutory authority” seems to have been interpreted to mean 
in strict compliance with statutory authority.  Since Navy 
and Coast Guard force planning, building, and design are 
not specifically addressed statutorily there has been no 
resultant meaningful coordination.  
Both the Coast Guard and Navy conduct extensive 
operations in the littorals.  However, the missions 
conducted are quite different.  The Coast Guard has 
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traditionally conducted law enforcement, search and rescue, 
domestic missions, and even expeditionary support to 
defense missions.  The Navy has conducted warfare.  The 
Coast Guard and Navy have co-existed in harmony and mutual 
support since inception.  The creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security and the mission growth of the Coast Guard 
should serve to further strengthen the relationship between 




Budget projects in the littorals include the Coast 
Guard’s Deepwater acquisition project, the Navy’s Littoral 
Combat Ship, Streetfighter, Destroyer 21, as well as an 
evolving understanding of the requirements both in the 
homeland and expeditionary.  At a glance, the Coast Guard’s 
historical multi-missioned cutters are at odds with the 
Navy’s warfighting combatants.  The current reality is that 
the Coast Guard Fleet has little to offer in terms of 
compatible capabilities, or even independent warfighting 
capabilities.  Likewise, the Navy has been reluctant to 
transition to a smaller, faster, more responsive fleet of 
combatants.  Their strike and presence capability remains 
strong, but their capability in the littorals is suspect.   
The table below provides comparative data concerning 
the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Project Maritime Security 
Cutter Large and the Navy’s Arleigh Burke Class Aegis 
Destroyers.  Granted, the Navy is working to develop a more 
comparable Littoral Combat Ship, but for the purposes of 
budget discussion and developing a way ahead the Arleigh 
Burke Class Aegis Destroyers are adequate.  
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Table 1.   Capability comparison between Maritime 
Security Cutter and Arleigh Burke Class Aegis Destroyer43 
 
 Maritime Security Cutter 
(Large) 
Arleigh Burke Class 
Destroyers (AEGIS) 
In-Service/ 








Length:  421 471 
Beam:  54.2 66.9 
Draught:  21 20.7 
Range (nm):  12,000@9kts 4,400@20kts 
Speed (knots):  29 31 
Complement: 129 344 
Guns: • 1 Bofors 57 mm/70 Mk 3; 
220 rds/min to 9.3 n miles; 
weight of shell 2.4 kg. 
• 1 General Dynamics 20 mm 
Phalanx Mk 15 CIWS. 4-
12.7 mm MGs. 
 
• United Defense 5 in; 20 or 
10 (ERGM) rds/min; GPS 
guidance to 63 n miles; 
warhead 72 bomblets; cep 
10m. 
• 2 Hughes 20 mm Vulcan 
Phalanx 6-barrelled Mk 15; 
4,500 rds/min combined to 1 
n mile. Fitted with IR 
detectors for tracking 
small craft.  
Missiles: none • SLCM: GCD/Hughes Tomahawk; 
Tercom aided guidance to 
700 n miles (TLAM-C and D) 
or 1,000 n miles (TLAM-C 
Block III) at 0.7 Mach; 
warhead 454 kg (TLAM-C) or 
347 kg shaped charge. 
• SAM: GDC Standard SM-2MR 
Block IV; command/inertial 
guidance; semi-active radar 
homing to 90 n miles.  
Combat data 
systems: 
To be announced. 
 
TADIX-B and TADIL-J. CEC. 
Links 4, 11 and 16.  
Weapons 
Control: 
None SWG-3 Mk 37 Tomahawk WCS. 
Aegis multitarget tracking 
with Mk 99 Mod 3 MFCS and 
three Mk 80 illuminators. GWS 
34 GFCS (includes Mk 160 Mod 8 
computing system and 
Kollmorgen Mk 46 optronic 
sight). Singer Librascope Mk 
116 FCS for ASW. 
                     
43








Radars: • Surface search: TRS 3D/16; 
E/F-band. 
• Fire control: SPQ-9B; I/J-
band. 
 
• Air search/fire control: 
RCA SPY-1D phased arrays; 
3D; E/F-band. 




There is a significant problem with the proposed 
Maritime Security Cutter and the comparison to the Arleigh 
Burke Class Aegis Destroyer highlights the problem well. 
While the Maritime Security Cutter may seem like a good buy 
at $140 million per Cutter verse the almost $1 billion per 
Destroyer, the cost comparison does not adequately address 
the capability gap.44  The guns planned for the Maritime 
Security Cutter have a range of 9.3 nautical miles with a 
5-pound projectile.  Comparing this against the Arleigh 
Burke Class which can send a Globally Position System 
tracked shell 63 nautical miles with 72 bomblet warheads.  
Or the Vulcan cannon system that can fire 4,500 rounds per 
minute out to 1 nautical mile, specifically fitted with 
infrared detectors for tracking small craft.  Similarly the 
comparison on missiles, the Cutter has none and none 
planned.  The Arleigh Burke Class has Tomahawks effective 
out to 1,000 nautical miles as well as Surface to Air 
Missiles effective out to 90 nautical miles.  The weapons 
control and combat data systems are not comparable, only 
because the new cutter plans do not include the 
capabilities.  Finally, the radars provided to the Cutter 
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are basic, while the Arleigh Burke Class is working with 
equipment several generations beyond.   
The point is the approximate cost of an Arleigh Burke 
Class Aegis Destroyer is $1 Billion dollars.  The entire 
Deepwater acquisition project will include up to 91 ships, 
35 fixed-wing aircraft, 34 helicopters, 76 unmanned 
surveillance aircraft, and upgrade of 49 existing cutters 
and 93 helicopters, and is estimated to cost $17 billion.45  
However, if the new Maritime Security Cutters are delivered 
with guns, missiles, and radars only marginally better than 
the current legacy fleet then the cost is too high.   
This is not to suggest that each of the new Maritime 
Security Cutters requires the weapons suite of an Aegis 
Destroyer.  However, the Maritime Security Cutters must be 
able to detect, track, intercept, and potentially destroy 
threats.   
As the National Fleet Policy Statement suggests, the 
Coast Guard and Navy must cooperate to design a non-
redundant naval force.  The current offensive strike 
challenged cutter fleet is a result of focus on domestic 
missions and acquisition economy.  The threats in the 
maritime domain and the potential catastrophic impact to 
the country and global economy dictate that the new 
generations of cutters have substantial sensor, intercept, 
and even strike capabilities.  The Coast Guard will 
continue to operate on the homeland littorals and must 
build ships to meet the challenges and requirements of the 
homeland littorals.  Conversely, the Navy must build the 
appropriate combatant for the expeditionary littorals.  
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While the ships should be similar and the opportunity for 
leveraging design, development and ship building is 
extraordinary there remains the necessary autonomy to 
select weapons, communications, propulsion suites that best 
suite each service’s force requirements.  
  
1. Deepwater Acquisition Project 
The National Strategy states that our objective is not 
only to mitigate terror attacks, but also to detect and 
prevent terror attacks in the United States.  Coast Guard 
Cutters are typically scheduled for approximated 185 patrol 
days per year, roughly half the year.  To maintain a cutter 
on a specific station around the clock throughout the year 
would require 2.5 cutters:  one cutter on station, one just 
having left station, and a portion of a cutter in overhaul 
status preparing for deployment.  If the Coast Guard 
operational concept included maintaining cutters off of the 
55 Tier one ports in the country it would require 138 
cutters.  A single cutter patrolling off of important ports 
would not provide the necessary surveillance, detection and 
response desired. More likely the Maritime Security Cutter 
Large would be assigned several Maritime Security Cutter 
Mediums, several Fast Response Cutters, and of course 
numerous Multi-mission Cutter Helicopters.  Adapting the 
Navy’s sea dominance theory, the Coast Guard must recognize 
the value of controlling the homeland littorals, off the 55 
tier one ports.  Just as the Navy controls the seas, sea 
lanes, and approaches through Battle Group presence, so too 
the Coast Guard must control the littorals through 
presence. 
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Thus, for a port like Los Angeles-Long Beach, 
California there may be a requirement for 2 Maritime 
Security Cutters-Large, 3 Maritime Security Cutters-Medium, 
6 Fast Response Cutters, and 5 Multi-mission Cutter 
Helicopters.  To support just the port of Los Angeles-Long 
beach would require: 5 Maritime Security Cutters-Large, 7.5 
Maritime Security Cutters-Medium, 15 Fast Response Cutters, 
and 12.5 multi-mission Cutter Helicopters.  The requirement 
for all 55 tier one ports would be (in order): 275, 412, 
825, and 687.  There are both economies and additional 
concerns.   
These littoral operating groups offer economies in 
some geographic locations.  For example, the ports of New 
York City and New Jersey could be combined into a larger 
operating group.  Perhaps more Maritime Security Cutters 
Large and Medium would not be needed, but the additional 
Fast Response Cutters might.  Similarly, the ports of 
Jacksonville, Florida, Savannah, Georgia and Charleston, 
South Carolina could be combined into a littoral operating 
group.   
Unfortunately, the metrics do not address current 
Coast Guard missions.  The Coast Guard relishes the sales 
pitch and economy of multi-missioned assets.  However, the 
post 911 reality is that the expectation of Cutters 
assigned to provide maritime homeland security will not be 
conducting fisheries, migrant interdiction, counter drug 
patrols, or search and rescue at the same time.  The Coast 
Guard needs to request forces to conduct numerous missions;  
However, the economy of multi-use platforms should not be 
confused with conducting multiple missions at the same 
time.  
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Single cutter presence 24-hours a day in each of the 
55 ports and a roaming presence in the other ports would 
require approximately 148 cutters.  Lineal application of 
the littoral operating group would require 1,512 cutters.  
The 148 to 1,512 Cutters should serve as the extreme 
boundaries to the discussion.  By no means is a 1,512 
Cutter Coast Guard realistic.  Likewise, by no means does a 
148 Cutter Coast Guard provide the resource capability to 
provide maritime homeland security and defense along the 
entire 95,000 mile coastline.   
The current deepwater program calls for 91 cutters to 
conduct all Coast Guard missions.  In a recent report by 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS) for Congress, the 
number of cutters was increased to 180, see table 3 below.  
However, the report suggests that only an additional 30 
Cutters are needed for emerging missions, or maritime 
homeland security and defense.  Just thirty cutters are 
needed to provide security to 55 tier one ports, 261 total 
ports, and 95,000 miles of coastline.  As 911 demonstrated 
both our incredible vulnerability it also demonstrated our 
arrogance.  The United States has been catching up to 
airline security long since in place in numerous other 
countries.  While, the United States sea supremacy has been 
unchallenged it does not mean that we should not take the 
threat seriously.  
As the Maritime Security Cutter and Arleigh Burke 
Class Destroyer comparison demonstrated, the Deepwater 
project desperately needs to address weapons, sensors, and 
communications networking systems.  Both the quantity and 
capabilities of the Deepwater Project need to be addressed.  
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Maritime Security Cutter Large 8 35 9 44 
Maritime Security Cutter Medium 25 36 10 46 
Fast Response Cutters 58 79 11 90 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft 35 29 6 35 
Recovery and Surveillance Aircraft 34 32 1 33 
Multi-mission Cutter Helicopters 93 118 21 139 
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) 69 85 38 123 
High Altitude Endurance UAV 7 21 4 25 
 
 At present, the new Maritime Security Cutters 
resemble the antiquated legacy cutter fleet too closely.  
While the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship capability set is 
more than the Coast Guard needs, it adequately provides the 
ability to sense, detect, intercept, and destroy if 
necessary.  The Coast Guard could economize the weapons 
suite by reducing the redundant quantity of systems 
onboard, but not quality.  For example, the cutters will 
not need 64 Tomahawk launch tubes, but perhaps 8 or 12 
would be adequate.  A component design that would enable 
selection of mission capability suites would be 
appropriate.  The Navy and Coast Guard could autonomously 
work to develop mission suite requirements.  Component 
packages would mix weapons, sensors, communication, and 
propulsion systems to meet specific mission requirements.  
A component design would enable the both the Coast Guard 
and Navy to increase or decrease capabilities as needed.  
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There are numerous projects in the ports, such as: the 
Container Security Initiative, the Joint Harbor Operations 
Centers, Littoral Surveillance System, Maritime Safety and 
Security Teams ($76M), National Transportation Security 
Plan, US-Visit program, and the Automated Identification 
System.  The Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland 
Security are working to tie all the initiatives together, 
while continuing to assess opportunities to enhance 
security in the ports.  
Congress and the Department of Homeland Security have 
demonstrated leadership and commitment to enhance maritime 
security through the enactment of the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002, new security 
amendments to the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS), and its complementary 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) 
strengthen and add additional protective layers of defense 
to our Nation's port security.47  Congress and the 
Department of Homeland security have made sincere efforts 
to innovate through legislation and some supportive 
funding.  The Coast Guard has been designated as the lead 
agency for maritime homeland security, and as such is the 
lead agency for the majority of maritime security 
enhancement efforts.  The Coast Guard’s leadership has been 
critical to the successes achieved to date.   
 
1. Leadership 
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The Coast Guard’s leadership has included a refreshing 
assertiveness and willingness to take responsibility.  
However, most impressively the Coast Guard recognized 
immediately that single-minded dictatorial imposition of 
policies and plans would be ineffective.  Instead, the 
Coast Guard has sought to include as many interested 
agencies and partners as possible.   
a. `All-Inclusive 
The maritime environment and particularly the 
ports are multi-jurisdictional with numerous customers 
critically important to the security of the port 
infrastructure.  The connection between maritime security 
and ensuring free trade is direct.  Economic independence 
and growth is dependent upon enhanced maritime security.  
The Coast Guard has included commercial shipping 
enterprise, local, state, and federal enforcement agencies 
as well as the Department of Defense services in the 
enhanced maritime security effort.48   The all-inclusive 
effort to spur innovation will have coincident impact in 
reducing cost associated with enhanced security.  The all-
inclusive effort may be difficult to quantify in terms of 
financial benefit, but quantifying enhanced effectiveness 
should not be difficult.  
b. Accuracy 
Coast Guard leadership must remain attentive to 
the absolute need for accuracy in assessing the current 
situation as well as the critical evaluation of numerous 
container, vessel, and port facility security plans.  
Development of the future Seamless Maritime Concept force 
is dependent upon an accurate assessment of threats, 
                     
48
 Stephen Flynn, The Vulnerable Home Front, Foreign Affairs, 
Sept/Oct 2004 
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vulnerabilities, and the necessary counter capabilities.  
For example, that the CRS is the only source for an updated 
Deepwater resource baseline is inappropriate.  The Coast 
Guard must move quickly to develop a comprehensive plan 
that incorporates the traditional missions and emerging 
missions into a comprehensive recapitalization plan.   
 
2. Commitment 
The initial enactment of legislation and attempts to 
coordinate innovation to meet the challenge of enhanced 
maritime security has been excellent.  The designation of 
the Coast Guard as the lead federal agency for maritime 
homeland security and significant increase in the Coast 
Guard budget since 911 has demonstrated concern over the 
maritime domain vulnerabilities.  
  
Table 3.   Coast Guard Operating Expenses and Deepwater 
Project Budgets for Fiscal Years 1992 and 2000 through 
200549 
 


































- $73M $42M $320M $475M $645M $678M 
 
Between 1992 and 2001 the total Coast Guard budget 
increased at less than 4% per year. Coming out of the 
service survival budget battles through the 1980s, the 
                     
49http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/index.htm, and 
www.millennium.marmot.org:90/.../13,43,195,E/frameset&FF=dspace+shuttle
s+management&1,1,  15 December, 2004.   
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budget remained essentially stagnant through 2001.  Then in 
2002 it jumped to 13%, only to jump another 28% in 2003.  
However, the Operating Expenses budget was being increased 
at less than 2% per year through the 1990s.  Considering 
the cost of living increases, a less than 2% increase is an 
operating expense budget decrease in real dollars. The 
significant and sustained increase in 2001 and beyond can 
be attributed to mission growth, or increased maritime 
homeland security and defense missions.   
Similar to the total Coast Guard budget and operating 
expenses budget the deepwater project was not fully funded.  
Just as the damage to resources and operations can not be 
recouped by simply increasing the budget in future years 
the same amount shorted in previous years, neither can the 
Deepwater project catch up to original cost and delivery 
projections.   
Thus commitment to enhanced maritime security and 
defense calls for long term congressional budget support.  
However, in reality the Coast Guard must commit necessary 
resources to recapitalization even when measured against 
reducing current operations.  For example, it is more 
important to commit to recapitalization than it is to 
engage in costly maintenance and repair of increasingly 
antiquated and capability challenge fleet of cutters.  If 
the choice is to push forward with recapitalization or to 
repair a minimally effect cutter --- push forward with 
recapitalization.  The Coast Guard must be willing to 
demonstrate commitment above and beyond any expectation of 
commitment from Congress.     
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CHAPTER V: SUMMARY 
To defeat this [asymmetric terrorist] threat we 
must make use of every tool in our arsenal—
military power, better homeland defenses, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts 
to cut off terrorist financing. The war against 
terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise 
of uncertain duration... - President George W. 
Bush, September 17, 200250 
Implementing the Seamless Maritime Concept into all 
phases of maritime homeland security and defense is an 
essential step in achieving President Bush’s prescription 
to utilize our Nation’s every tool in the fight against 
global terror.  We must tie together resources across all 
seams (Federal, State and Local; military, law enforcement, 
and commercial.  We must overcome jurisdictional issues, 
roles and mission debates, information sharing challenges, 
and diversity of purpose.  It is an enormous undertaking.  
Critical to the success of the Seamless Maritime Concept 





The world is changing and so to is our response to it.  
The Department of Homeland Security, at the direction of 
the President, implemented the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) in March 2004.  The NIMS will enable 
responders at all jurisdictional levels and across all 
disciplines to work together more effectively and 
                     
50
 President George W. Bush, National Security Strategy, the White 
House, 17 September, 2002. 
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efficiently.   One of the best practices being implemented 
into NIMS is the Incident Command System (ICS).  ICS is a 
standard, on-scene, all-hazards incident management system 
already in use by firefighters, hazardous materials teams, 
rescuers and emergency medical teams.  The ICS has been 
established by the NIMS as the standardized incident 
organizational structure for the management of all 
incidents.51  
The maritime domain and the Seamless Maritime Concept 
are similar in theory.  Significant effort has been spent 
attempting to nail down the roles and missions associated 
with maritime homeland security and defense.  However, it 
is clear that the respondents to the event are 
standardized.  Like scenario two from Chapter 1, if there 
is intelligence of a vessel with a man-portable air defense 
system off the coast of Boston, Massachusetts the maritime 
respondents are clear.  NIMS and the ICS ensure 
standardized terminology, tactics, procedures, and 
concepts.  The ICS becomes the leadership from different 
responding agencies and services and a discussion on best 
possible intervention.  This is not far from how we plan to 
handle maritime events now.  The critical difference is 
that the ICS must expand beyond just the Coast Guard and 
Navy.  To be as effective as possible, the ICS must be 
seamless across the maritime domain. 
The NIMS and ICS are emergency management equivalents 
of the Seamless Maritime Concept.  Just as all emergency 
responders have similar purpose, so too do the maritime 
                     
51
 Federal Emergency Management Agency Website, National Incident 
Management System and Incident Command System links: 
http://www.fema.gov/txt/nims/nims_ics_position_paper.txt, 15 December, 
2004. 
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respondents.  Determining the responding agency or service 
may be much more of an availability issue, than a roles and 
mission’s issue.  
The Coast Guard’s effort to be all-inclusive in 
maritime domain awareness and maritime homeland security 




 Cooperation, as opposed to leadership, is the 
alignment and leveraging of effort.  The maritime domain 
entities need to move beyond simple cooperation. For 
example, the Coast Guard and Navy have a long standing 
relationship of support.  However the relationship must 
evolve to recognize the opportunity to leverage similar 
efforts.  There are two opportunities for leveraged 
cooperation: Naval Coastal Warfare and the National Fleet.  
The Coast Guard Area Commanders are currently designated as 
the MDZ Commanders, and as such have a significant role to 
play in the Naval Coastal Warfare way ahead.  Further, the 
Coast Guard has extensive experience in the coastal 
regions, ports, and harbors.  The Coast Guard continues to 
be an excellent fit to meet the demands of both 
expeditionary and domestic Naval Coastal Warfare and 
coastal defense missions.  This is not to say that the Navy 
does not have a role, quite the contrary.  Naval Coastal 
Warfare missions provide an exemplary opportunity for the 
services to leverage core expertise and competencies into 
the best possible employment of forces.  The second example 
is National Fleet.  The issue of building Naval Combatants 
capable of forward presence and strike is a complex one.  
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Over simplifying the problem by stating that new Deepwater 
Project Maritime Security Cutters require the same 
capability set is misleading.  However, there remains 
significant overlap in the design capabilities between the 
ships.  There are significant opportunities to cooperate 
through a joint programming office and reap economies in 
design, development, cost, and ensure interoperability.   
 The significant challenges in the maritime domain 
require a seamless response.  A seamless response requires 
the maritime entities leverage cooperation to gain 
efficiencies.  
 
C. TECHNOLOGICAL APPLICATION AND INNOVATION 
 
New Maritime Security Cutters, new weapons systems, 
new surveillance and detection systems, and new 
communications systems are examples of the application of 
new technologies.  The MSTA implementation of the AIS is 
another example of technological innovation and 
application.  Development and application of technology 
across the maritime domain continues at a steady pace. 
As the Seamless Maritime Concept becomes more 
sophisticated and supports the various maritime missions 
and numerous maritime respondents, the continued 
application of technology remains critical to success.  The 
constant examination of successful technologies in other 
domains and the search for developing unique maritime 
technologies mandates a constant examination of the 
maritime seams and leveraged cooperation. 
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For example, a newly outfitted Maritime Security 
Cutter could be leverage to provide surveillance, warning, 
and law enforcement or military response off the coast of a 
Tier one port.  The presence of a capable Coast Guard 
Cutter should free other resources to pursue other 
missions.  If the Coast Guard Cutter is conducting law 
enforcement off the coast, it should free some of the state 
and local maritime assets in the port.  Similarly it should 
free the Navy from a potential defense readiness 
perspective, perhaps lengthening the standby status of 
regional Naval Combatants. 
For technology to be leveraged in the seamless 
maritime concept, the leveraging of Customs vessels 
conducting security and law enforcement patrols, or State 
maritime vessels conducting surge operations must also be 
maximized.   
Technology is the innovation of better surveillance, 
better detection, better communications and weapons 
systems.  But technological innovation and application is 
also fed back into the strategic concepts, to ensure 




"The world changed on September 11th, 2001.  We 
learned that a threat that gathers on the other 
side of the earth can strike our own cities and 
kill our own citizens.  It's an important lesson; 
one we can never forget.  Oceans can no longer 
protect America from the dangers of this world.  
We're protected by daily vigilance at home.  And 
we will be protected by resolute and decisive 
66 
action against threats abroad." - President 
George W. Bush, September 17, 200252 
It is appropriate that each of the maritime domain 
respondents retain their identities and autonomy.  The 
Seamless Maritime Concept identifies the opportunity to 
move beyond roles and missions, beyond a single focal point 
of response, and beyond operational and resource 
inefficiencies.   
The Seamless Maritime Concept is a sophisticated 
strategy that seeks to leverage the strengths of each 
service and agency, and share information, resources, and 
opportunities across the domain.   
                     
52
 President George W. Bush, National Security Strategy, the White 
House, 17 September 2002. 
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